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The Scope of Immunity for Legislators and
Their Employees
The Constitution provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either
House, [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in
any other Place."' The literal wording of the clause suggests an
absolute legislative immunity limited to words spoken in the actual
chambers of Congress.2 But the courts have not inclined to such a
purely verbal test so limited in locus; instead, they have interpreted
the guaranty to include much more than verbal expression. Despite
occasional loose talk of an absolute immunity for anything done or
said during the congressional session,2 however, the reach of the Clause
has never been entirely clear. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court
have generated a renewed uncertainty, and suggest that the Justices
may be about to narrow substantially the scope of the legislative
privilege.4
I.
The Supreme Court first passed on the meaning of the Speech or
Debate Clause in 1880. Kilbourn v. Thompson" was a suit for false
imprisonment, brought against the Sergeant at Arms of the House and
1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 6.
2. Cf. Methodist Fed'n for Social Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729, 734 (D.D.C.
1956) (dissenting opinion). The limited nature of the Clause becomes apparent by
comparison to the other immunity granted in the same sentence of Section 6:
They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privi.
leged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses,
and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in
either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
The privilege from arrest in "all" cases other than those excepted contrasts sharply with
the "in either House" language of the speech or debate privilege.
The Founding Fathers did not discuss the Speech or Debate Clause at the Constitu-
tional Convention. The wording of the Clause comes nearly verbatim from the analo.
gous provision in the Articles of Confederation, art. V, which in turn derived from an
act of Parliament adopted following the Glorious Revolution. I W. & M., 2d Sess,, c. 2,
art. 9 (1688). For the English history, see Note, The Bribed Congressman's Inmmunity
from Prosecution, 75 YALE L.J. 335, 336-39 (1965).
3. E.g., Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 122 (1963) (dictum); Barsky v. United
States, 167 F.2d 241, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948); Lusk v. Han.
rahan, 244 F. Supp. 539, 540 (E.D. Ill. 1965) (dictum); Keogh v. Pearson, 244 F. Supp.
482. 486 (D.D.C. 1965) (dictum); cf. Powell v. McCormack, 266 F. Supp. 354, 355 (D.D.C,
1967) (dictum).
4. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169
(1966).
5. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
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certain representatives, after the congressmen had the Sergeant confine
the plaintiff to the District of Columbia jail for refusing to answer
committee questions about the collapse of the Jay Cooke Company.0
The Court permitted the action against the Sergeant at Arms, but held
that the Clause immunized the legislators; it dismissed as unduly
"narrow" the view of the provision that would "limit it to words
spoken in debate," s and quoted approvingly from the landmark
English decision in Stockdale v. HansardO where the Queen's Bench
had conferred an immunity on members of Parliament for "whatever is
done within the halls of [the] assembly... ."0 It also quoted from the
Massachusetts case of Coffin v. Coffinl-which the Court termed
"the most authoritative in this country"'- where Chief Judge Parsons
had extended the state constitutional immunity to "every thing said or
done by [the member] as a representative, in the exercise of the func-
tions of that office, without inquiring whether the exercise was regular
according to the rules of the house, or irregular and against their
rules."13
Despite the approving citations, however, the Kilbourn Court did
not adopt the broad and unqualified language of either Stockdale or
Coffin. Instead, the justices decided only that the Clause protected the
activities challenged in the case before them: committee reports,
6. The committee, composed of five representatives, reported Kilbourn's refusal to
answer the questions, whereupon the House found him in contempt and ordered his
incarceration. Id. at 174-75.
7. All the defendants argued that Congress had the power to order the arrest for
contempt, and that all persons contributing to or effectuating that order vwere therefore
immune as a consequence of the power itself. The congressmen added that they were
discharging their duties as members of the House and were therefore immune on
grounds of legislative privilege. Id. at 177-79. The Court's holding that Congress lacked
the power to order the arrest left Thompson without a defense, apparently on the
theory that the immunity shielded "members" only. Id. at 200; see p. 373 infra.
8. 103 U.S. at 204.
9. 9 A. & E. 1, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112 (Q.B. 1839).
10. Id. at 114, 112 Eng. Rep. at 1156. Stockdale held that the parliamentary immunity
did not extend to the private printer of the debates to protect him in a libel suit
brought for words of a member. The decision was overturned by statute, 3 & 4 Vict.,
c. 9 (1840).
The Kilbourn Court suggested that the Speech or Debate Clause codified the laws of
England, including the rule in Stockdale, 103 U.S. at 202; but the explanation is question-
able, given that Stockdale itself was decided some fifty years after the adoption of the
Constitution.
11. 4 Mfass. 1 (1808).
12. 103 U.S. at 204.
13. 4 Mass. at 27. Despite the breadth of its language, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held that the privilege did not protect a member from civil suit when
the alleged slander was made in a casual remark in the chamber. The decision came in
the teeth of the Massachusetts Constitution, providing that "[tjhe freedom of delibera-
tion, speech and debate in either house of the legislature is so essential to the rights of
the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action or
complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever." Mass. Const. art. XXI.
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resolutions offered in the chamber, and voting, whether done vocally
or through tellers.14 If this comprised the holding of the case, as in a
technical sense it did, Kilbourn might stand for a quite narrow inter-
pretation of the Clause, conferring an immunity only for essential
legislative activities carried out within the literal walls of Congress.
But Mr. Justice Miller went on to state, "In short, [the immunity
embraces] things generally done in a session of the House by one of
its members in relation to the business before it." Whether this was
intended as a shorthand summary of what had gone before or as a new
general definition for the scope of immunity, the Court left unclear.
If its statement stood as holding, it suggested, in essence, an objective
"scope of legislative employment" test for a legislative immunity
transcending the literal wording of the Clause: a member could claim
protection for any of the sort of "things generally done in a session,"
provided it had some pertinency "to the business before [the legis-
lature]."
No matter how broadly or narrowly it intended to define the im-
munity, however, in the next paragraph of its opinion the Kilbourn
Court staked out a right to hold legislators legally responsible for
"things done . . . of an extraordinary character," comparable, for
example, to the Long Parliament's "execution of the Chief Magis-
trate" or to the French Assembly's "assuming the function of a court
for capital punishment." "[W]e are not prepared to say," wrote Mr.
Justice Miller, "that such an utter perversion of [the congressmen's]
powers to a criminal purpose would be screened from punishment by
the constitutional provision for freedom of debate."'1 The reservation
of a judicial prerogative to inquire into the subjective "criminal
purpose" of the legislator, coupled with the casual appearance of a
definition for the Clause which may or may not have been intended
by the Court as a general statement of the immunity's scope, signaled
a significant withdrawal from the sweeping grants of privilege issued in
Stockdale and Coffin.
Seventy years later, the Supreme Court again dealt with the Clause.
In Tenney v. Brandhove,17 the plaintiff brought a civil rights suit
against the members of the California Senate Fact-Finding Committee
on Un-American Activities under Section 1983,18 alleging that de-
14. 103 U.S. at 204.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 204-05.
17. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), formerly 8 U.S.C. § 43.
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fendants had coerced and intimidated him in his exercise of first
amendment rights by summoning him to appear before them and
then ordering him prosecuted for contempt when he refused to
answer their questions. The Court, through Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
denied that the term "any person" in Section 1983 included a state
legislator acting within the scope of his authority; the 1871 Congress
that passed the Civil Rights Act would not, given an already century-
old privilege, have curtailed the immunity so drastically by recourse to
such general language.19 The "immunity" invoked by the Court was
apparently of a general common-law character, unattached to any
specific constitutional provisions, state or federal.20 Still, Tenney pur-
ported to follow Kilbourn's test, asking whether the legislators were
acting "within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity."21 But Mr.
Justice Frankfurter then brought legislative investigations conclusively
within the sphere,m contrary to Kilbourn dicta on the subject,2m and
limited judicial supervision to cases where it was "obvious that there
[had been] . . . a usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the
Judiciary or Executive."24 The Tenney Court also omitted Kilbourn's
pertinency requirement, and, most significantly, it expressly denied a
judicial power to inquire into a legislator's motive, stating that "[t]he
claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege."25
19. 341 U.S. at 376.
20. The Tenney opinion seemed to draw on a common-law tradition thought to
illuminate, if not survive, state and federal constitutional enactments. Even before the
English Bill of Rights of 1688, an incipient common-law immunity from liability for
civil injury had taken clear form as the judiciary recognized that the benefits from
compensating victims and deterring official excesses did not outweigh the social loss in
inhibiting courageous, independent parliamentary action and in deterring persons
espousing novel and therefore radical ideas from entering public servic. See 1 F. HARPER
& F. JAwEs, THE LAw oF ToRrs 428 (1956); 2 id. 1641. As the parliamentary struggle
with the monarchy developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it became clear
that the immunity from civil suit shielding the speech of legislators did not provide a
parallel defense against criminal prosecution by the Crown. Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 A.
& E. 1, 113-14, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112, 1156 (Q.B. 1839). In his heyday, the King regularly
prosecuted critical members of Parliament for seditious libel, a crime loosely defined as
any criticism of the government. See, e.g., Rex v. Tutchin, 14 St. Tr. 1095 (1704). reported
sub nom. Tuchin's Case, Holt, K.B. 423, 90 Eng. Rep. 1133 (K.B. nrd.). When Parliament
gained the upper hand in 1688, it demanded and received from the Crown a Bill of
Rights which, although it did not eliminate all avenues of monarchical repression,
contained a free-speech-and-debate clause good against both private suit and public
prosecution. 1 W. & M., 2d Sess. c. 2, art. 9 (1688); 6 W. Howswosmr, HIrSORY OF EBWUSu
LAw 231 (2d ed. 1936). See generally C. Wrrr E, TiE HisoRY or ENGISH PAnIAMTAIIY
PRIVIEGE (1921).
21. 341 US. at 376.
22. Id. at 377-78.
23. 103 U.S. at 196-97.
24. 341 U.S. at 378.
25. Id. at 377. The impropriety of judicial inquiry into the motives of legislators
has its roots in the doctrine of separation of powers; it dates from the case of Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), where the Court refused to inquire into the motives
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Tenney's impact on Kilbourn depended largely on what one made
of Kilbourn in the first place. If that decision did no more than tack
committee reports and voting to speech and debate, and if the talk
about scrutiny of motive was limited to congressional beheadings
of the Chief Executive, then Tenney effectively did nothing more than
add committee investigating to the existing roster of absolutely pro-
tected activities. But if Kilbourn limited an objective scope.of-employ-
ment test by the threat of judicial inquiry into personal intent, then
Tenney represented a severe cutback of judicial review to legislative
"usurpations," and a correspondingly significant expansion of legis-
lative privilege.
Aside from Kilbourn and Tenney, three lower court decisions be.
tween 1930 and 1960 in District of Columbia defamation suits grave
the only further content to the Clause until 1966. In Cochran v.
Couzens, 26 the tourt of appeals granted the defendant senator an
absolute immunity from a slander action where the complaint showed
his words were "uttered in the course of a speech ... in the chamber
of the Senate," even though they were unrelated to any business then
before the body2 Apparently, where the defendant's utterance satis-
fied the literal language of the Clause itself, the Kilbourn suggestion
of a pertinency requirement would not apply.28 In Long v. Ansell,20
a libel action based on reprints of a Senate speech taken from the
Congressional Record and mailed to the defendant senator's home
state, Judge Van Orsdel remarked in dictum that a defense under the
Clause "would be without force, since the acts charged have only a
remote connection with the speech. While the published articles were
in part reproductions of the speech, the offense consists not in what
of the Georgia legislature, allegedly bribed nearly to a man to enact the Yazoo land
grant. See C. McGaRAr, YAzoo (1966). In Fletcher the Court decided that the validity of a
legislative act does not depend on the motives of its many members; practically speaking,
it would be impossible for the judges to conduct the necessary investigations. For the
possible limitation of the Fletcher rule to Congress, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962).
But deference to foimal enactments of even a co-equal branch of govetnment does
not dictate similar respect for the acts of a single legislator. The teasons for congressional
immunity do not demand that the Court refuse to examine motives in Its quest for the
proper linits of the Speech or Debate Clause. See Note, The Bribed Congress ,nan's
Immunity from Prosecution, 75 YA. L.J. 335, 340 (1965). Despite the special factors
apparent in the Fletcher situation, subsequent courts have failed to differentiate acts of
Congress and those of one of its members. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180
(1966); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951).
26. 42 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
27. Id. at 784.
28. Cochran was willing to remit the plaintiff to the uncertain remedy of a disciplilary
action against the senator by his peers. See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 5, cl. 2; 42 F.2d at 78.,
29. 69 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
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was said in the Senate, but in the publication and circularizing of the
libelous documents."30 The distinction between speech and publica-
tion was not an appealing one, especially given the constitutional
mandate requiring the printing of the Congressional Record;31 and
unless the Public Printer were to be personally liable for all he set
in type, the Long dictum would have to differentiate initial publica-
tion in the Record from subsequent reprinting by the senator. Such
a distinction would make sense only on a restrictive, literalist reading
of the Clause that limited the privilege as closely as possible to words
actually spoken in Congress, but not on a more expansive, scope-of-
employment interpretation. It was, however, precisely the line subse-
quently drawn by Judge Youngdahl in McGovern v. Martz,32 nine
years after Tenney. There the congressman brought an action for
defamation, and the defendant counterclaimed for a libel appearing
in the Congressional Record appendix and in various republications.
In a narrow construction of the Clause, the court extended an abso-
lute immunity to the printed appendix, but only a qualified immunity
to the reprints; the purpose the court attributed to the legislative
privilege-"complete and uninhibited discussion among legislators"33
-simply did not apply to a republication for constituents. 34
In 1966 the Supreme Court offered its third reading of the Clause.
United States v. Johnson35 was a criminal prosecution of a former
representative for conflict of interest and conspiracy to defraud the
United States30 The Government's evidence included a speech the
defendant had made on the floor of the House. The Court held the
speech inadmissible in a prosecution under general criminal statutes,3 7
30. Id. at 389.
31. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, d. 3.
32. 182 F. Supp. 343 (1960).
33. Id. at 347 (emphasis in original).
34. The discussion of republication was dictum. On a broader view of the immunity,
the court would have had to explain why the Clause should protect intralcgslative
communication but not a congressman's statements to his electorate. On either theory
the court might well have indicated why, if the reason for the privilegc applied only to
the former case, the legislator should enjoy even a qualified immunity in the latter.
For another, peripherally relevant District of Columbia decision, cf. Methodist Fed'u
for Social Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1956) (suit to enjoin publication
of Internal Security Subcommittee booklet terming plaintiff a Communist.front organiza.
tion, and suit to declare resolution ordering printing unconstitutional, held dismirted
for want or jurisdiction as to senator and for failure to state a cause of action as to Public
Printer).
35. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
36. 18 U.S.C. §§ 281 (conflict of interest), 37 (fraud) (1964).
37. 383 U.S. at 180. The Clause would not protect the legislator, said the Court, where
the prosecution involved no "legislative acts . . . [nor the defendant's) motives for
performing them" nor did the Court pass on the case where "a prozecution, though
possibly entailing inquiry into legislative acts or motivations, is founded upon a narrowly
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and remanded for retrial. The congressman's remarks had gone in to
show improper motive, and that, said Mr. Justice Harlan, "is precisely
what the Speech or Debate Clause generally forecloses from executive
and judicial inquiry.' 38 The statement all but demolished the restric-
tive reading of Kilbourn, which would protect legislators only from
direct prosecution for activities on the floor of Congress, since such a
narrow interpretation of the Clause arguably would not prohibit the
use of a speech merely as background evidence in a prosecution for
a substantive offense committed outside the House-here, lobbying
before the Justice Department to win dismissal of charges against
constituents.8 9
But a tacit withdrawal from a strict construction of Kilbourn did
not leave the Court with an objective scope-of-employment formula-
tion. The intimation that the Clause might not always foreclose
inquiry into motive suddenly ripened into precisely the consideration
of improper purpose that Tenney had held impermissible:
No argument is made, nor do we think that it could be success-
fully contended, that the... Clause reaches conduct, such as was
involved in the attempt to influence the Department of Justice,
that is in no wise related to the due functioning of the legislative
process.40
Now, representations before administrative agencies are as much a part
of the legislative function, and therefore within an objective scope-of-
employment test for the immunity, as voting and making speeches. 41
Perhaps Harlan was saying that an attempt to win dismissal of an
indictment from the Justice Department is per se beyond the "due
functioning of the legislative process," no matter what the motives of
the suppliant Congressman. But that is an unlikely reading of the
passage, given the number of occasions where, for one good-faith
political reason or another, a representative might consider dismissal of
charges against third parties a wise move for the Justice Department
to make. The Court's seemingly cavalier attitude toward any possible
claim of immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause was more
drawn statute passed by Congress in the exercise of its legislative power to regulate tle
conduct of its members." Id. at 185.
38. Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 172.
40. Id.
41. Cf. May v. United States, 175 F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1949), (Congressman who
received compensation for his services before an agency was guilty of an illegal act even
though he acted "within the scope of his official duties as a Congressman'; Note, The
Bribed Congressman's Immunity from Prosecution, 75 YALE L.J. 35, 386, 346 (1965).
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intelligible if the Justices were attaching a pejorative connotation to
the word "influence": not any intercession, but an intercession with
improper motive would receive no protection under the Clause. But if
this was the case, the effect of the "influence" language was to abandon
Tenney's professions of judicial refusal to assess motive and to move
back toward the original Kilbourn assertion that the judges might in-
quire into "criminal purpose," even while the Court insisted it was
following the test laid down in Tenney.
After Johnson, then, the results of the cases appeared more consis-
tent than the reasons used to arrive at them. Congressmen enjoyed an
absolute immunity for speeches, votes, and reports in the chamber, as
well as for committee investigating wherever held, but only a quali-
fied privilege for other customary legislative activity beyond the walls
of the Houses -and for republications of their hitherto immune
speeches.
The status of immunity for legislative employees was considerably
less certain. Kilbourn in its disposition of the action against the various
defendants had suggested, although it did not hold, that the constitu-
tional provision applied only to "members."42 Tenney obfuscated
matters with an off-hand observation that the "[]egislative privilege
...deserves greater respect [where congressmen are involved] than
where an official acting on behalf of the legislature is sued" 43-- a pas-
sage leaving it unclear whether the employee shared to some extent or
other in the congressman's constitutional immunity,4" or whether his
only protection lay in the non-constitutional rules of privilege that
the courts had developed for judicial and executive officers.45
The executive's immunity had begun with Spalding v. Vilas,40 a suit
against the Postmaster General for malicious interference with con-
tract rights by official pronouncements and communications. The
Supreme Court held that the defendant enjoyed an absolute immunity
so long as he had taken action "having more or less connection with
42. According to the report of the case in 26 L. Ed. 377, 383, "the other defendants,
after pleading the same matters set out in Thompson's plea, add [the immunity
argument], pertinent to themselves and not to him . Cf. 103 US. at 177 (s)llabus).
43. 341 U.S. at 378.
44. Cf. Comment, Absolute Privilege as Applied to Investigators for Congressional
Committees, 63 COLUmt. L. Rsv. 326, 329 (1963).
45. Cf. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959). See also Note, Civil Liability of
Subordinate State Officials Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts and the Doctrine of Official
Immunity, 44 CALM. L. REv. 887 (1956); Note, Liability of Public Officers to Suit Under
the Civil Rights Acts, 46 COLUM. L. REv. 614 (1946).
46. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
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the general matters committed by law to his control or supervision";4"
personal malice toward the plaintiff would be relevant only where the
defendant as "head of a Department" had acted "in reference to
matters... manifestly or palpably beyond his authority ... ,"48 Lower
federal courts subsequently applied the Spalding rule to protect the
Attorney General, 49 the Secretary of the Interior 0 and the members
of the Securities and Exchange Commission l from libel and malicious
interference suits. In Barr v. Matteo,r2 a sharply divided Supreme
Court expanded the principle to cover the Acting Director of the
Office of Rent Stabilization, but with a sliding test for the scope of
the immunity depending on the duties of the protected officer:
[T]he occasions upon which the acts of the head of an executive
department will be protected by the privilege are doubtless far
broader than in the case of an officer with less sweeping functions.
But that is because the higher the post, the broader the range of
responsibilities and duties, and the wider the scope of discretion,
it entails. It is not the title of his office but the duties with which
the particular officer sought to be made to respond in damages is
entrusted-the relation of the act complained of to "matters coin-
mitted by law to his control or supervision," Spalding v. Vilas,
-. . -which must provide the guide in delineating the scope of
the rule which clothes the official acts of the executive officer with
immunity from civil defamation suits. 3
Later decisions in turn extended the Barr rule far down the govern.
mental hierarchy to include such functionaries as postal clerks,r" road
and ground maintenance foremenr 'and state race track officials.'6
47. Id. at 498.
48. Id.
49. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
50. Glass v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940); see also Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F.2d
1168 (D.C. Cir. 1927) (Secretary of the Treasury).
51. Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
52. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
53. Id. at 573-74.
54. Commercial Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Murray, 182 F. Supp. 724 (D. Md. 1960) (mail
'fraud).
55. Gamer v. Rathbum, 346 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1965) (negligence),
56. Porter v. Eyster, 294 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1961) (lbel). See also S o S agging Co.
-v. Barker, 366 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1966) (National Forest Supervisor and Timber Staff
Assistant; conspiracy 'to monopolize sale of timber); Chavez v. Kelley, 364 F-2d 113
,(10th Cir. 1966) (bureau of narcotics local chief; relaying slanderous grand jury informa-
ition to customs officers); Harmon v. Superior Court, 329 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1964) (Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, certain judges, the County Sheriff, District Attorney,
,County Clerk, Probation Officer, Court Trustee, County Auditor and County Treasurer,
:general allegation of conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of constitutional rights); Brownfield
,v. Landon, 307 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Air Force Inspector General; slander at
meeting called to clear up charges against electric company); Poss v. Lieberman, 299
F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1962) (claim representative of the United States Department of Health,
374
Legislative Immunity
Wheeldin v. Wheeler57 gave the Supreme Court its first opportunity
to determine the applicability to legislative employees of the common-
law immunity recognized for executive employees in Spalding and
Barr; but the Court chose to skirt the issue. In the course of deciding
that Congress had not created a federal cause of action for a House
Un-American Activities Committee employee's service of subpoena
allegedly causing the plaintiff to lose his job, Mr. Justice Douglas ob-
served in dictum that the Barr immunity could not apply where the
defendant in issuing the subpoena "was not acting sufficiently within
the scope of his authority to bring the doctrine into play."r55 The pas-
sage implied that the doctrine would have come into play had the
legislative employee not exceeded his delegated powers. In the course
of sidestepping the applicability of the Barr immunity, unfortunately,
the Court did not indicate under what circumstances, if any, the
Speech or Debate immunity would also have become available.
To be sure, the question was academic if the two immunities
immunized alike. But they could not, and they did not. They could
not because Congress might always overturn Barr by statute, while
Johnson stood as a matter of constitutional construction. And they did
not, because by the time of Johnson and Wheeler the two privileges
had diverged widely in both the range and character of their applica-
tion. The Barr rule established an absolute immunity within the outer
perimeter of the executive officer's function, including virtually all
officers in that branch of government. The Johnson decision, however,
not only had reintroduced the subjective motive element to an un-
certain degree, but also had left unsettled how far down the legislative
hierarchy the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause reached.
Education, and Welfare; libel in confidential report for internal agency use); Ore
Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 299 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1962) (contracting officer
of the General Services Agency and his assistant; willful and malicious filing of false
reports resulting in cancellation of construction contract); Bershad v. Wood, 290 F.2d
714 (9th Cir. 1961) (Internal Revenue officers; levying on plaintiff's bank deposits); De
Levay v. Richmond County School Board, 248 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1960) (state school
board members; defamation) (alternate holding); Sauber v. Gliedman, 283 F.2d 941 (7th
Cir. 1960) (Special Assistant to the Attorney General; malicious and slanderous statements
made to press); Preble v. Johnson, 275 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1960) (naval enlisted service-
men and civil service employees of Naval Air Technical Training Center libel made
in course of investigating plaintiff's performance of official duties). For cases holding
that the acts complained of lay beyond the scope of employment, see Kelley v. Dunne,
344 F.2d 129 (1st Cir. 1965) (postal officer; tort liability arising from iarrantless search
and seizure); Hughes v. Johnson, 305 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962); (federal game wrdens;
unlawful search of premises over protest by owners and without warrant or arrest); Selico
v. Jackson, 201 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Cal. 1962) (city police officers; unlawful assault).
57. 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
58. Id. at 651.
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II.
Last May came the most recent Supreme Court discussion of the
Clause. Dombrowski v. Eastland 9 originated in the same series of
events that gave rise to the celebrated Dombrowski v. Pfister'0 decided
two years earlier. The petitioners-a Louisiana civil rights organiza-
tion, Southern Conference Educational Fund (SCEF), and its execu-
tive director, Dombrowski-alleged that Senator James Eastland of
Mississippi and his Internal Security Subcommittee counsel, J. G. Sour-
wine, had conspired with Louisiana officials, under color of unconsti-
tutional state laws, to contrive illegal seizures of petitioners' books,
records, and membership lists in violation of the Fourth Amendment
and to deter petitioners from the exercise of their First Amendment
rights."'
According to the complaint, in the summer of 1963 Jack Rogers,
counsel to the Louisiana Joint Legislative Committee on Un-American
Activities, informed Sourwine that the state legislators were planning
to get hold of petitioners' records and that he would notify Sourwine
as soon as they had them in their possession.6 2 Sometime in August,
the state committee decided to obtain the documents under the search-
and-seizure provisions of the Louisiana anti-subversive laws rather than
through a legislative subpoena. 3 In mid-September Rogers and Sour-
wine again discussed the impending raid;6 4 from this conversation, if
from anything, arises the inference of a knowing concert of action
between the respondents and the state officers. 6 On October 4, Louisi-
ana authorities seized the entire contents of the SCEF office-a truck-
load's worth-and arrested Dombrowski. 0
Later on in the month, a state judge quashed both the search and
arrest warrants as not based on probable cause,07 and ordered the
59. 387 U.S. 82 (1967).
60. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
61. A separate action against the state officials is pending in the federal district court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Petition for Certiorari, Dombrowski v. Eastland,
387 U.S. 82 (1967), at 15-16.
62. Record at 40, 71.
63. Compare the statement of Colonel Alexander, staff director of the Joint Com-
mittee (placing the development of the plan to use search warrants rather than subpoenas
as early as August 27, 1963), Brief for Petitioners at 6 n.3, with that of Rogers (placing
the decision-making date in late September), Record at 71, 72.
64. Record at 40, 71.
65. Sourwine told Eastland of his mid-September talk with Rogers. Record at 40.
Petitioners' inference is that Sourwine and Eastland knew of the nature and type of the
raid before it occurred, that they concurred in the method, and that they may have
encouraged it.
66. Record at 21-25. See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. at 487 n.4.
67. Record at 19, 20. The dismissal at the preliminary hearing is unreported.
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seized materials returned to petitioners; 8 in April, 1965, the Supreme
Court responded to petitioners' extraordinary suit to enjoin enforce-
ment of the anti-subversive statute by declaring the law unconstitu-
tional on its face,6 9 and ordered "immediate return of all papers and
documents seized." 70 Before these developments, however, Rogers
telephoned Sourwine on the night of the raids to tell him of the day's
events.7 ' Sourwine arrived in New Orleans early the next morning,
October 5, with a dutch of United States Senate subpoenas in his
briefcase.72
Here the tales of the litigants part company. Sourwine claims that
the subpoenas were signed in blank by Eastland-a standard operating
procedure73 -and that after examining the seized documents and dis-
cussing them with Eastland over the telephone, he filled out the
subpoenas to cover all of petitioners' records and served them on
Rogers.7 4 The petitioners, on the other hand, intimate that the sub-
poenas were all filled out by the time Sourwine arrived on the scene,
because he, perhaps with Eastland, had prepared them in Washington
in anticipation of the raid.", The fact that the papers were dated
October 4, the day of the raid and the day before Sourwine got to
New Orleans, certainly adds a string to petitioners' bow; Sourwine says
that the New Orleans secretary who typed out the papers made a mis-
take.7 r At any rate, the SCEF material passed into federal "possession"
on October 5, with Sourwine leaving the materials in the custody of
the state police.77
On October 25, petitioners moved in state court for return of their
property. Rogers defended on the ground that all the materials had
68. The opinion, reproduced in Brief for Petitioners, AppendLx B, rested on Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
69. 380 U.S. at 494 (declaratory relief granted), 497 (remand to state courts to salmage
statute by narrowing construction).
70. Id. at 497.
71. Record at 40, 48, 73.
72. Record at 52.
73. See Brief for Respondents, at 9 n.5.
74. Record at 32, 41.
75. Record at 32, 33; Brief for Petitioners at 10.
76. Record at 33, 41. Sourwine himself has acquired a reputation for mistakes. See,
e.g., Sherrill, How to Succeed on the Potomac. Be an Investigator, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8,
1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 146:
Several times Sourwine has carelessly subpoenaed the wrong person, but even when
the mistake became obvious he refused to change it. One witness haled before the
internal Security Subcommittee by error had to fight through the courts for 10
years before he cleared his name. Sourwine testified that he had called the witness
in good faith on the basis of information received in a letter, but when the defense
counsel asked to see the letter, Sourwine replied that lie had destro)ed it "by
mistake."
77. Record at 41, 72.
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passed to the federal government and were hence unavailable. Tile
defense was the first notice to petitioners that their goods had changed
hands some three weeks earlier. Two days after the hearing, on Sun-
day, October 27, petitioners sued Rogers and other state officers in
federal district court to compel return of the documents, and moved
for an order to restrain respondents from transferring the records.
Judge Ainsworth, upon receiving respondents' assurances that the
records would not be disturbed, ordered the case continued over the
weekend and the motion returnable on Monday, October 28.7s Peti-
tioners sent a telegram to Eastland to inform him of the Monday
hearing.7 9 The Senator then called Sourwine, who had returned to
New Orleans for the state proceeding, and, according to the uncon-
tested averments in petitioners' complaint, directed him to get the
records out of Louisiana.80
In the dead of Sunday night, Sourwine supervised the loading of
all the documents into a van graciously lent him by Louisiana officials,
and shipped the load across the state line into Mississippi for storage
with the clerk of the Chancery Court in Woodville.81 The next
morning, respondents' attorneys informed the Louisiana federal court
that the records had passed beyond its jurisdiction, so that the issue
underlying petitioners' request for a temporary restraining order was
moot.
8 2
In a few days SCEF and Dombrowski brought a Section 1983 civil
rights suit against Eastland and Sourwine in the District of Columbia
district court for an injunction and $500,000 damages, charging them
with participation in the initial Louisiana conspiracy.83 Judge Holtzoff
dismissed the claim for injunctive relief on a separation-of-powers
theory, relying on respondents' affidavits that the records had passed
into the possession of the legislative subcommittee. 4 In the damage
78. Record at 28-29.
79. The telegram stated: "Federal Judge Robert Ainsworth has rcquested your
presence in his office 9:30 a.m., October 28th, to discuss an injunction enjoining turning
over SCEF and Smith and Waltzer records to Senator Eastland." Record at 54.
80. Complaint, Record at 7, 8; Record at 55.
81. Complaint, Record at 7, 8; Record at 55, 56, 58.
82. Record at 29.
83. Petitioners were able to sue the federal officials on an underlying federal con-
stitutional claim-here, violation of first and fourteenth amendment rights--only by
virtue of the defendants' alleged participation in a state conspiracy. Cf. Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963) (no general federal "under color' statute applicable
to federal officials). In effect, the suit was against defendants as private citizens rather
than in their capacity as senator and subcommittee counsel. Absent alleged participation
by state officers, petitioners could have sued Eastland and Sourwine only on a state.
based cause of action, such as trespass.
84. The opinion is reproduced in the Record at 12-15.
378
Vol. 77, 366, 1967
Legislative Immunity
action Judge Sirica granted without opinion respondents' motion for
summary judgment accompanied by affidavits denying participation in
the conspiracy. 5
In an opinion rendered three weeks before the Supreme Court's
decision in Johnson, the court of appeals affirmed both judgments per
curiam.8 6 It denied equitable relief for failure to join the entire sub-
committee as an indispensable superior under the rule in Williams v.
Fanning,s7 and because an injunction directed to the defendants alone
would be inefficacious.88 The damage action gave the court more trou-
ble. What with the razzle-dazzle of document shuffling, the judges
understandably thought they "might have considerable difficulty in
concluding that there were no disputed issues of fact requiring ex-
ploration and resolution by means of a trial."89 But pursuit of that
inquiry was unnecessary, since the record before the district court
"contained unchallenged facts of a nature and scope sufficient to give
[both] appellees an immunity" under the Speech or Debate Glause.0°
Congress could undoubtedly investigate subversive activities in the
United States; the Internal Security Subcommittee, by virtue of its
decade-long "active interest in appellants," could validly have autho-
rized Eastland to subpoena the SCEF documents, although in fact it
had not; and its subsequent approval of his action operated as a "nunc
pro tunc ratification and consequent validation," at least for immunity
purposes. 91 The defendants, in short, came within the Tenney scope of
legitimate legislative activity. The court distinguished Wheeldin as a
case where the defendant had acted beyond the scope of the authority
delegated to him; 92 and petitioners' argument that the protection of
the legislative immunity doctrine might not extend to Sourwine was
disposed of by a fleeting and unilluminating reference to Barr v.
Matteo.93
85. Brief for Petitioners at 17-18.
86. Dombrowski v. Burbank, 358 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
87. 332 U.S. 490 (1947).
88. 358 F.2d at 824 (relying on Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515 (1937)).
89. 358 F.2d at 824.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 825. The limitation to the immunity context was necessary to avoid
petitioners' argument from the contempt prosecution cases that criminal convictions
would not stand where underlying subpoenas were invalid for issuance without prior
authorization of the full committee. Shelton v. United States, 327 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir.
1963); cf. United States v. Rumely, 345 US. 41, 48 (1953); Brief for Petitioners,
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967) at 72 n.64; Petition for Certiorari at 28 n.17.
92. 358 F.2d at 825.
93. Id. at 826 n.ll. Perhaps the court thought that Barr had overruled, sub silentio,
the Kilbourn language denying constitutional immunity to the legislative emplo)ee.
If the court recognized that Barr involved a judge-made rule and Kilbourn a consttu-
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Unfortunately, the court's argument discussed only the portion of
petitioners' case relating to Sourwine's use of the subpoenas to bring
the material within federal possession after the Louisiana seizures; it
overlooked petitioners' contention that the appellees had participated
in the initial conspiracy to raid the files.9 4 There were two possible
explanations for the omission, neither of them satisfactory. The first
was that the justification from subsequent ratification applied only to
respondents' post-raid conduct, while the Tenney rule protected them
for whatever might have gone before. The court could have developed
a respectable argument that cooperation with state officers in procur-
ing information is a customary legislative function, and so within the
Tenney test for scope of activity; but that was hardly a matter to be
decided sub silentio.
The second explanation was that the court regarded the subsequent
ratification as immunizing respondents for their activities both before
and after the raid. But nobody was suggesting that the subcommittee's
subsequent ratification even purported to operate as a nunc pro tunc
validation of the defendants' participation in a search and seizure
which a state judge had already held unlawful. If the sole basis for
respondents' invocation of a Speech or Debate immunity now lay in
the subsequent ratification by the subcommittee, the defense of privi-
lege for pre-raid activity should have failed.90
Appellants were arguing, in effect, only for the chance to go against
the defendants stripped of their immunity and to show the Section
1983 requisite of actual malice. The court, however, placed the allega.
tion of malice in the wrong hopper, stating the contention as one that
"appellees, by acting without prior authorization, acted with a mali-
cious purpose .... ,6 That kind of lawsuit, the court said, would be
tional privilege, so that Barr could apply without overruling Kilbourn, it did not so
indicate.
94. See Record at 4-7 for the allegation; the court acknowledged it, 358 F.2d at 822,
but did not discuss it. See the Supreme Court notation of the omission, 387 US. at 83-84.
95. The Wheeldin case should have controlled on the court's theory that without a
subsequent ratification defendants would have exceeded their authority. Still, the court
brushed aside plaintiffs' argument that the defendants' positions with the Subcommittee
should be "regarded as incidental and irrelevant to the present suit; and that appelces
[should] be viewed as in the position of any other citizen"; that, said the court, "ignore[dl
that the conduct of which appellants complain . . . could not have been undertaken had
appellees had no official legislative positions and responsibilities." 358 F.2d at 826, But
liability under Section 1983 does not require that the conspirator have the status of a
United States Senator or subcommittee counsel; and if the court really meant that only
the fact of subsequent ratification saved defendants from liability for their conduct after
the raid, then the absence of that ratification should have subjected the defendants to a
Wheeldin-type liability qua private citizens for their ultra vires acts before the raid,
96. 358 F.2d at 825 n.9.
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improper, because Tenney "preclude[d] inquiry into appellees' motives
to determine the legitimacy of their conduct ... .- 07 But even if that
statement of petitioners' theory of the case was correct-which it was
not-its view of the applicable law was good for only three weeks past
the date of decision. Twenty days after the court of appeals had dis-
posed of Dombrowski, the Supreme Court handed down the opinion
in Johnson with its language undermining Tenney's flat proscription
of inquiry into motive s8
The Supreme Court's per curiam disposition of Dombrowski 0 is
hardly calculated to relieve the confusion. To begin with, it lacks so
much as a reference to the injunction suit, although that issue was
presented in the petition for certiorari,100 not excluded in the grant,10 '
and fully treated in the briefs. 0 2 On the damage action, the Court
notes the failure of the court below to discuss the evidence as it
related to respondents' pre-raid activity, 03 but it does not remand for
reconsideration. 04
The Court holds that, on the present state of the record, the peti-
tioners can go to trial against Sourwine, but not against Eastland. As
to the Senator, the justices "agree with the lower courts that petition-
ers' complaint must be dismissed. The record does not contain evi-
dence of his involvement in any activity that could result in lia-
bility."' 0 5 Since the damage action was decided on summary judgment
without trial, the only evidentiary deficiency the Court can be speak-
ing of is petitioners' failure to set forth specific facts showing a genu-
ine issue for trial in opposition to respondents' motion with support-
ing affidavits for summary judgment. That is an eminently proper basis
for a grant of summary judgment, but the reasoning implies that
petitioners could have gone to trial against Eastland if only they had
presented such evidence, and that in turn means that the Speech or
97. Id.
98. See p. 372 supra.
99. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967).
100. Petition for Certiorari at 35-41.
101. 385 U.S. 812 (1966).
102. Brief for Petitioner at 106-12; Brief for Respondents at 41-49. Perhaps the Court
thought the issue frivolous or moot.
103. 378 U.S. at 83-84.
104. The Court scrupulously refrains from passing on the legal consequences of the
collaboration, if it occurred. See 387 US. at 84. The Court also notes the existence of
"controverted evidence," such as the dispute over the date on Sounine's subpoenas to
Rogers, which it says "affords more than merely colorable substance to petitioners'
assertions .... .' Id. It carefully declines to consider whether such evidence standing alone
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Debate immunity did not automatically protect the Senator. Since on
a Tenney theory the Clause should shield the Senator from suit re-
gardless of his motives as long as he was acting in behalf of an investi-
gating committee, and thus within the objective scope of his employ-
ment,106 the theory the Court is now relying on to find the protection
potentially unavailable depending on the state of petitioners' evidence
becomes crucial in determining how the privilege has narrowed,
The Court says, "It is the purpose and office of the doctrine of
legislative immunity, having its roots in the Speech or Debate Clause
of the Constitution [citing Kilbourn] . . . , that legislators engaged 'in
the sphere of legitimate activity' [citing Tenney] . .. should be pro-
tected not only from the consequences of litigation's results but also
from the burden of defending themselves." 10 7 That explanation de-
parts somewhat from the rationale offered only fifteen months earlier
in Johnson, where Mr. Justice Harlan had announced that the "pre-
dominate thrust" of the Clause was to afford protection from "instiga-
tion of criminal charges against critical or disfavored legislators by
the executive in a judicial forum ..... ,10 The difference in the issues
presented by the two cases-one a civil suit, the other a criminal
prosecution-may explain the sudden shift in rationale, but can hardly
justify the switch. The successive analyses look more like ad hoe
responses to separate attacks on the privilege than like elements of an
overarching, comprehensive theory of the Clause. More importantly,
the explanation now tendered for the immunity cannot explain the
holding in the case, unless the Court is now implying that Eastland
may not have been acting within the Tenney test of scope of employ-
ment; for the Court has just finished suggesting that Eastland would
have had to face precisely the burden that the Clause is now said to
guard against if only the petitioners had proffered some evidence in
response to the motion for summary judgment. The only basis for that
finding, though, would be the Senator's improper purpose and malice
toward petitioners, since any cooperation with state officials would
otherwise be well within his legislative employment, and such con-
sideration of motive was just what Tenney should have excluded from
judicial consideration. The Court does not mention Johnson's hesitant
endorsement of a modified inspection of motive, although the implica-
tion of the Dombrowski language is that petitioners could have suc-
106. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Burbank, 358 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
107. 387 U.S. at 83-84.
108. 383 U.S. at 182 (emphasis added).
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ceeded by showing senatorial mala fides. The result is a privilege whose
"outer perimeters" and inner content are both more unsettled now
than ever before.
The question of employee immunity fares no better. In explaining
why Sourwine must face trial while Eastland gets off, the Court reports
it "has held . . . that [the constitutional] doctrine is less absolute,
although applicable, when applied to officers or employees of a legis-
lative body, rather than to legislators themselves."' 0 0 But the language
in the cases the Court refers to for its past "holdings" barely rises to
the level of dicta: Tenney had said that the one "deserves greater
respect" than the other,110 and Wheeldin had only intimated that the
common law of Barr v. Matteo might apply."" Dombrowski at least
makes it clear that Wheeldin did not exclude application of the con-
stitutional privilege by a process of implication; unfortunately, it is
impossible to determine whether Dombrowski itself has now excluded
Barr v. Matteo by the same process, included it as a supplement, or
subsumed it along with the Speech or Debate immunity in one all-
encompassing constitutional privilege for employees.
In Doambrowski the difference between legislators and their employ-
ees is said to turn on the state of petitioners' evidence. But the evi-
dence tending to show pre-raid conspiratorial participation was more
or less the same against both Eastland and Sourwine;" 2  against both,
the complaint surely stated a cause of action under Section 1983, and,
except for the failure to produce enough evidence to circumvent the
immunity bar, it would presumably have entitled the petitioners to
carry the factual issues to a jury. The real line-drawing must occur
109. 387 U.S. at 85. Sourwine reportedly responded to the holding with the complaint:
"I thought immunity was like pregnancy-either you were or you weren't. If a Govern-
ment worker can be harassed for years in court, what good is immunity?" The point
seems well taken: already Sounine faces another witness' $3-million suit for mistreat-
ment. Sherrill, How to Succeed on the Potomac: Be an Investigator, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8,
1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 146. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1967, at 35, col. 1, where the most
recent legal action against Sourwine is described. The National Conference for New
Politics and the Mississippi Freedom Democrats seek 5OO,000 in damages and an injunc-
tion against Sourwine, Eastland, and Benjamin Mandel, research director of the sub-
committee. The complaint alleges that two persons "of state, local or Federal law
enforcement and/or extra legal agencies" stole the documents from plaintiffs' temporary
hotel rooms in Chicago and delievered them to Eastland or Sourvine. Attorneys for the
defendants acknowledged that the subcommittee had possession of the documents, but
no one would disclose how it came into possession of the missing papers.
110. 341 U.S. at 378.
111. See 373 U.S. at 650-51.
112. The evidence against Sourwine is only somewhat stronger, the misdating of the
subpoenas is the only major difference. Still, the Court emphasizes this point, S87 U.S.
at 84, perhaps thus disparaging the evidentiary value of the pre-raid telephone calls.
The Court is probably correct to dismiss the conversations, because equally plausible
inferences of legitimate activity arise from the same circumstances.
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somewhere in the interstices of the expression "less absolute, although
applicable." Perhaps the Court is thinking of a graduated distinction
analogous to the one established in Barr v. Matteo. That raises the
question whether the constitutional immunity alone suffices to protect
congressional members and officers, or whether the nonconstitutional
privilege developed in the executive sphere should carry over to the
legislature. And if so, the next question is where the former leaves off
and the latter begins.
III.
In basing a general legislative immunity on the constitutional
foundation of a broad interpretation of the Speech or Debate Clause,
the Supreme Court has lost some of the flexibility it might have re-
tained had it given the Clause a strictly literal reading while supple-
menting it with a common law standard of the sort fashioned for
executive officers. Still, even with the constitutional approach the
justices have fixed firmly the principle-vital for continued judicial
supervision-that not the dignity of high political office, but the
nature of the functions exercised is the touchstone of the constitu-
tional privilege. Within that framework, the courts have managed to
reserve a good deal of room for maneuver despite the constraints of,
constitutional adjudication.
Flexibility is distinguishable from wooliness, however, and not one
of the rationales the courts have devised for the immunity has ex-
plained the doctrine any more than was necessary to dispose of the
case at hand. Maintaining unfettered communications between legis.
lators'13 gets rid of the libel cases; but standing alone it imposes art
Sunduly restricted scope on the immunity, given the need for communi-
cation to constituents and representation before executive agencies. 14
A more decisive criticism is that such a narrow theory of the immunity
by itself cannot justify other judicial sallies beyond the four walls of
the Clause, since securing a free exchange of views among legislators
lies well within the power of the constitutional provision even when
read literally.
Unfortunately, the rationales the Court has advanced for these latter,
more far-ranging forays are inadequate to justify extension of the
118. See, e.g., McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343, 347 (DD.C. 1960).J 114. The "lobbying" function of congressmen has long been the subject of scholarly
commentary. See, e.g., V. 0. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESsuan GRours (3d ed. 1952);
E. GiurFFrI, CoNcmass: ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE (3d ed. 1961).
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constitutional privilege. First, preserving "legislative peace of mind"16
by sparing senators and representatives the threat of inconvenient
trials and personal liability" 6 is surely not the ultimate consideration
when private citizens sue. The rationale of sparing members of Con-
gress the rigors of litigation ignores that the Department of Justice
provides counsel gratis"--so that the demands of the legal process
amount to little more than helping prepare affidavits to accompany
the motions for summary judgment, and perhaps testifying if the
case reaches trial. And the theory that money judgments must be
avoided similarly overlooks the availability of private tort insurance
or public indemnificationUs
Second, the need to restrain executive intimidation and harass-
ment'1 9 cannot be the true explanation for the "predominate thrust"
of the privilege20 even in the criminal cases, for that argument would
lead-as it has not yet-to invalidation of the broad conflict-of-interest
and defrauding - the - United States statutes'-" enforced on occasion
against errant congressmen. -2
Still, the explanations when taken together perhaps do add up to a
fairly coherent view of the scope of the privilege. The central feature
underlying each of the rationales, but left more or less unexplored in
the opinions, is the prime requirement for any judicially-created im-
munity doctrine: the courts' own interest in reconciling control of
aberrant conduct by individual legislators or staff members with a
115. McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343, 346 (D.D.C. 1960).
116. See, e.g., Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949); Coffin v. Coffin, 4
Mass. 1, 27 (1808), quoted approvingly, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 163, 203 (1831).
117. 2 U.S.C. § 118 (1964).
118. There are, perhaps, cogent objections to any judicial decision that explicidtly
reasons along such lines; but they originate more in political-question than in scope-of-
immunity considerations. See p. 386 infra. Several commentators have urged the ex-
pansion of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1954), to cover legislators and
their subordinates. See, e.g., Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional Speech-Its
Origin, Meaning and Scope, 99 U. PA. L. Rlv. 960 (1951); Handler & Klein, The
Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against Government Execttive Officials, 74
HARv. L. REv. 44, 76 (1960). See also Lovell, Scope of the Legislative Investigational
Power and Redress for its Abuse, 8 HAsmcs L.J. 276 (1957).
119. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367, 378 (1951); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 201-02 (1881).
120. The phrase is from United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 182 (196).
121. See note 36 supra; on the generality of the latter statute, see Goldstein,
Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959).
122. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (196R; May v. United States, 175
F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (bribery). But see United States v. Dietrich, 126 F. 664
(8th Cir. 1904).
Another occasionally mentioned rationale for the Clause turns on a conspiracy theory
of litigation. Representatives Halleck and M%[cCormack have expressed their concern that
without the immunity legislators might be subjected to a concert of litigious action
designed to tie up the entire Congress. See 99 Cox,. leC. 2356 et seq. (1953).
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healthy respect for a coordinate branch of the federal government.
This is close to the formal political-question issue,123 and, not sur-
prisingly, it appears all through the cases, although usually in the
guise of a more "classical" separation-of-powers rationale. The logical
product of the continuing judicial concern to respect the proper
bounds of legislative authority, while yet restraining its exercise,-and
the manifestation of the persistent pressure on the judges to broaden
the reach of the immunity-is a scope-of-employment doctrine.
That leaves the courts with the job of vindicating genuine private
grievance while still preserving legislative discretion.1214 One solution
is a slight restriction of the objective scope-of-employment immunity
along the subjective examination-of-purpose lines hinted at in Johnson
and Dombrowski. By this analysis, an aggrieved private party should
be allowed to proceed against a congressman and his employees wher-
ever he can state a cause of action for tortious conduct of a malicious
character, except a speech or debate in the chamber.'2 5 Complete
123. See generally Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional
Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966). In the case, however rare, where affirmation of the
lower court's decision on the merits seems indefensible given the shocking nature of the
defendant's conduct, but intervention in favor of plaintiff would result in a considerable
limitation on the government's freedom of action, the appellate court may resort to the
political-question doctrine to avoid having to make a direct choice. Id. at 580.81.
124. The same problem has arisen in the context of criminal prosecutions for failure
to answer questions before congressional investigating committees. See 2 U.S.C. § 192(1964). In Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), the Court reviewed a conviction
ior contempt of Congress arising from defendants refusal to make certain disclosures
which he claimed were beyond the authority of the committee to demand. The Govern-
ment asked the Court to affirm the conviction if there were any legislative purpose
which might have been furthered by the kind of disclosures sought; that is, if Congress
were acting within the range of its power (liberally construed). In far-reaching dicta,
the Court rejected the Government's view; because the Bill of Rights applies to Investiga.
tions as to all forms of governmental action, Congress must not cross the strict limits
of its authority. After an initial retreat from the broad language of Watkins, e.g,,
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (balancing); Wilkinson v. United
States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961), the Court has
returned to a rigorous supervision of the procedural niceties: a subpoena issued without
prior committee authorization, Shelton v. United States, 327 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
and a departure from the committee's own rules, Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S 109(1963), both vitiate a contempt conviction; furthermore, to satisfy the requirements of
e contempt statute, 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1964), the grand-jury indictment must specify the
subject matter to which the underlying questions were pertinent, Russell v. United
States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962), and the government at the trial must show pertinency beyond
a reasonable doubt, Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961).
It is not surprising that the Court sets different limits when it reviews the conduct
of congressmen in cases where they are defendants. There the issue of the scope of
legislative power is a sword in the hands of the private party, not a shield to him by
way of defense to a criminal prosecution. The dangers inherent in a clash between thejudiciary and the legislative branches are real enough where the Congressman merely
looks on at the loss of a criminal prosecution he has instigated, see W. MuRpiuy, CONORaSS
AND rIM COURT (1962) (Congressional reaction to Watkins and other decisions); they
become all the more alarming where the legislator stands open to injunctive restraint
and financial liability.
125. The cause of action will almost invariably be state-based, since there Is no
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protection of verbal expression within the halls of Congress is the
least the clear words of the Clause require, and is consistent with the
past decisions x 86
The proposed test does threaten an increase in litigation against
representatives, but the increase is limited to cases where the offense
charged is an intentional wrong. The limited vulnerability can be
analogized to the boundaries the Court has set for the citizen's right
to criticize his public officials.12 -, The comparison has more to recom-
mend itself than mere surface symmetry; the disparity betveen the
absolute immunity which the congressman currently enjoys and the
lesser privilege which the New York Times rule'2 confers on his
private critics may well "sanctify the powerful and silence debate....
[I]t will take a brave person to criticize government officials knowing
that in reply they may libel him with immunity in the name of defend-
ing the agency and their own position.'"1 - O Moreover, the new test for
legislative immunity will permit an aggrieved private party redress
against conduct that no rationale for the constitutional privilege pur-
ports to justify: the exercise of public power with intent to inflict
injury on private citizens or with reckless disregard for their interests.
gneral federal "under color" statute applicable to federal officials. Wheeldin v. Wheeler,
73 U.S. 647, 652 (1963). The suit against Eastland and Sourwine based on underl)ing
federal constitutional claims was possible only because of the defendants' alleged pard-
pation in a state conspiracy; otherwise, the petitioners would have had to find a
Louisiana cause of action. The involvement of first and fourteenth amendment rights
in the case arose only because of a quirk in the factual circumstances of the cae--an
alleged state conspiracy sufficient to support a Section 1983 cause of action. See note 83
supra. Because, then, the presentation of federal constitutional claims against congress.
men and their employees can arise only under unusual conditions, it would be unwiise
to distinguish, for purposes of defining the scope of the legislative immunity, between
such constitutional claims on the one hand, and mere statutory or common law claims
on the other.
126. Even here, though, the Court could reinstate the pertinency requirement it first
suggested in Kilbourn. See p. 368 supra. Only Cochran v. Couzens, 42 F-d 783 (D.C.
Cir. 1930), has purported to repudiate the rule that speech to be protected should have
some relevance to the congressman's business. See 1 F. HAnRPR & F. JAmEs, THE LI
oF ToRrs 427-29 (1956).
The temptation to tag libel as non-speech and therefore outside the immunity,
although appealing in other areas of constitutional law, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250 (1952) (group libel); cf. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966, has not yet
suggested itself here and should not be yielded to.
127. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254 (1964) ('actual malice" test
in libel suits brought by public officials).
128. See note 127 supra.
129. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 584-85 (1959) (dissenting opinion of Warren, C.J.).
The remarks of the Chief Justice were addressed, of course, to the executive immunity
that the majority was propounding in the case, and they came before the decision in
New York Times. But the disparity problem exists as well for legislators as for
administrators, and the "actual malice" rule in New York Times can redress the imbalance
only partially, so long as the members of Congress retain a truly absolute immunity.
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A plaintiff who can demonstrate such an abuse of the public trust as
that alleged in Dombrowski should be allowed his day in court.
The new rule should contain the further limitation that the plain-
tiff must have evidence of the defendant's malice before the trial
begins-evidence capable of satisfying the strict requirements of the
Federal Rules in response to a motion for summary judgment.1 0
Nothing prevents the justices from protecting the still-relevant con-
stitutional immunity from the vagaries of jury decisions by raising the
standard the trial court must apply to determine whether the evidence
is sufficient to present a question for the jury.181 The evidentiary re-
striction addresses itself to the theme of avoiding litigation first raised
in Kilbourn and reiterated in Doambrowski, but it also serves the
judicial interest in curtailing the number of cases presenting the
sensitive questions which can arise when congressmen are subjected
to the judiciary. 13 2
The Barr notion of a scope of immunity varying with the impor-
tance of the office held is relevant to the legislative employee prob-
lem. 133 This element of Barr can be viewed as another application of
the essentially political-question philosophy that judicial supervision
180. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
The absence of sophisticated pre-trial litigation-ending devices may have been slgnifl-
cant in the old Kilbourn times, but present-day arguments based on the inconvenience
of litigation to legislators are less persuasive. See Note, Absolute Immunity: Too Broad
a Protection for the "Public Interest"? 10 STAN. L. RFv. 589, 593-94 (1958).
131. Cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 868, 378 (1964) (coerced confession) (citing
approvingly Massachusetts procedure "under which the jury passes on [the question of
voluntariness only after the judge has fully and independently resolved the Issue
against the accused"); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (jurisdictional fact), cited
(to demonstrate its continued vitality) in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 878 U.S. 184, 190 n.6 (1964)
(concurring opinion of Brennan, J.); Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 251i
U.S. 287 (1921) (constitutional fact).
132. In reviewing criminal contempt prosecutions for refusals to answer questions,
the Court has eschewed considerations of motive wherever the justices could discern
an independent valid legislative purpose-but then have looked into motive anyway,
See Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 411 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 133, 184 (1959). Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 388 (1951) (dissenting
opinion of Douglas, J.): "[W]hen a committee perverts its power, brings down on un
individual the whole weight of government for an illegal or corrupt purpose, the reason
for the immunity ends." Perhaps more correctly, one of the reasons ends-encouragement
of free inquiry and action; another-avoidance of litigation-is just beginning.
One possible indicator of malice could be the extent to which the legislator has
failed to restrain himself in the methods he chooses to acquire desired information or
publicize matters he thinks the public should know about. A major deviation from
the least means available for achieving the legislative objective, whatever it may be, In
hardly consistent with a congressman's surprised innocence. The absence, up to now, of
any semblance of judicial supervision over investigatory tactics has encouraged a
wholesale delegation by congressmen of virtually unchecked power to their staff
assistants. See Sherrill, How to Succeed on the Potomac: Be an Investigator, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 8, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 146.
183. See p. 874 supra.
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of the action of a coordinate branch should decline as the function
exercised stands higher in the governmental hierarchy, and so the
relevance of the case to the congressional-staff question is not surpris-
ing. 34
But Barr also argues against adoption of the proposed restricted
scope of legislative privilege, since it accords members of the execu-
tive department an absolute immunity that the proposed legislative
standard will deny. Still, the courts should hesitate before extending
the absolute-immunity aspect of Barr from the executive to the legis-
lative context.' 35 The Barr rule stands as a matter of general law, and
as such it can always be overridden by act of Congress; it is a judicially-
fashioned rule of privilege that, although perhaps unduly broad in its
protection of government officers and unduly neglectful of the need
to compensate private hurt, can be justified in part by the relative
availability of popular reversal through the legislature. The Speech or
Debate immunity, on the other hand, arises from the Constitution,
and so can be modified, once determined by the courts, only through
the cumbersome amendment procedure or by judicial self-reversal; a
correspondingly higher obligation rests on the judges to fashion at the
outset a rule more sensitive to all interests at stake without recourse to
the responsibility-shifting philosophy that an initial misstep by the
courts will find ultimate correction in the political process.
134. Application of the Barr sliding test to Senate committee counsel could lead to
a significant curtailment of their range of activity. For a description of their virtually
unlimited power, see Sherrill, supra note 182.
135. There are other ways to dispose of Barr. One is that the case uas incorrectly decided
and ought to be overruled. The Barr Court split 5-4, and three justices would have
preferred only a qualified immunity. 360 U.S. 564, 584-85 (1959) (dissenting opinion of
Warren, C.J. 8- Douglas, J.); id. at 589 (dissenting opinion of Brennan, J., citing with
approval 2 F. HaPER 8- F. JAmEs, TnE LAw oF Toxas 1645 (1956)). Second, even if it is
too late in the day to undo Barr, the case ought to be distinguished. A possible dif-
ference is that plaintiffs there were also public employees, so that the absolute immunity
conferred on the defendant might be confined to "assumption of ris" situations. A
third disposition of Barr may lie in the differing nature of the executive and legislative
function. See, e.g., Comment, Absolute Privilege as Applied to Investigators for Con-
gressional Committees, 63 CoLU r. L. REV. 826, 329 n.30 (1963), although arguments based
on discretion necessary to performance of function seem equally applicable to both cases.
For an intimation that lower courts may have found Barr too much to take, = Kelley
v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129 (Ist Cir. 1965).
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